



SECURITY COUNCIL

STUDY GUIDE



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SECURITY COUNCIL – STUDY GUIDE

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ADDRESSING THE COUP D'ÉTAT IN MYANMAR

by Mark Jeršič

I. A (Somewhat) Brief Introduction

After a roughly 100-year long period of being under foreign rule, the country now known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar gained its independence from the British Empire in 1948. It may be fairly argued that the driving force for the move towards independence was Myanmar's army (the Burma National Army at the time) whose presence, as it turned out, was a prevailing theme to be continued in the development of the country, no less today.

After Myanmar gained its independence, however, signs of turmoil started appearing. In the following decade there were constant uprisings from different groups, some having support from the neighboring countries, which escalated to the point that the national military deemed it fit to intervene – thus, the first *coup d'état* happened in 1962 which turned the country into a one-party communist state with a direct military rule. This way of governing even continued after the revision of the constitution in 1974, which signified the start of a *de facto* constitutional dictatorship (Devi, 2014).

The authoritarian rule continued for the next decades with a move towards democracy only happening in 2015 when the Nobel peace prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won the elections. The move towards more democratic institutions, however, did not last – after NLD won the election in 2020 as well, the country's army declared that voter fraud took place – the election was thus (supposedly) invalid – and they would take action (Seekins, 2021).

II. The Current Situation

And took action they did. On the 1st of February 2021 the Myanmar military overthrew the civilian government in what the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar has labeled an illegal *coup d'état*,¹ which represents a direct attack on the rule of law in the country, frail as it was. As a consequence, the military commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing, has taken power (Andrews, 2021), thus once again reviving Myanmar's proclivity for military control.

Though motives for the *coup* have not been expressed explicitly and there have only been speculations, the central point for the escalation of the situation seems to have been alleged voter fraud (Andrews, 2021). Though it is not entirely clear if tinkering with the election actually took place, authoritative figures conducting investigations regarding the election process have labeled the elections as »fair overall« and that »there was no evidence to support the claim of widespread fraud« (Seekins, 2021; Andrews, 2021).

On the other hand, the people of Myanmar were, in some sense, united by the *coup d'état* – millions have taken to the streets to exercise their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly to demand democracy and the respect for human rights. The uproar, however, was countered by Myanmar's military *via* different measures, such as the prohibition of protests and marches and a curfew, but they also took to more violent measures such as the dispersal of protesters with the use of force. The new self-proclaimed governing body then committed additional human rights violations such as arbitrary deprivation of life, arbitrary detention and the right to privacy.² The situation is additionally worsened by the failing health system and insufficient food supplies (Rocha *et al.*, 2021; United Nations, 2021).

¹ On the question of legality of the coup, you can also consult the Al Mukarramah article, see the references.

² For more details see the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, see the bibliography.

III. An International Law Perspective

Based on what was said so far, it is evident that the situation impacts citizens' security and perhaps even international security, however, before we dive into the discussion of the intervention by the Security Council, we have to explore two questions: 1.) How do we analyze the *coup* from an international law perspective? and 2.) What response from the international community is warranted?

As we have discussed, there were hundreds of civilians killed by the oppression of the Military. Though the military conflict was restricted to Myanmar's military and the civil population, it is worth exploring if the situation can be classified only as internal turmoil, which means that the protection of humanitarian law and thus the Geneva Conventions is not afforded,³ or if the conflict is of such nature that it represents a non-international armed conflict – in such a case the common 3rd article of the Geneva Conventions sets a threshold that a country has to abide by. If we can label the situation as an armed conflict, humanitarian law may have been breached – though the distinction between armed conflict and internal turmoil can be quite a blurry one (Gandhi, 2001).

Additionally, as mentioned above, human rights (HR) violations have been recorded. However, as Myanmar has not signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the legal basis to establish HR standards has to be found somewhere else. On the one hand, Myanmar has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, on the other, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration may be consulted. It may also be worth exploring the implication of international customary law in the area of human rights.

Thirdly, in addition to the most recent Rohingya refugee crisis in 2016 (OCHA, 2018), it has been recorded that hundreds have been forced to flee to neighboring countries due to the current *coup d'état* (UN News, 2021). In this sense, we have to consider two things: if the

³ See the 2nd paragraph of the 1st article of the Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.

neighboring countries have ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees and the people who have been displaced fall under the definition of a refugee under the first article of the Convention, the standards that the Convention sets have to be upheld. On the other hand, if the people are not refugees as per the Convention's definition but have been displaced, they may still enjoy protection that international human rights law offers.

IV. The Role of the UN and the Security Council

The stance of the UN was made clear *via* the General Assembly⁴ which, once again, expressed that democracy and human rights are the bedrock that the UN is built upon and the *coup* directly contradicts such values. Though it was expected that the consensus would be wider, the stance seems to reflect the majority opinion – the voting ended with only one vote against the adoption of the Resolution, a slightly higher number of countries abstaining from voting.

As far as major powers go, the USA continues to strongly oppose the *coup* (*The White House*, 2021), the same policy also being pursued by the EU.⁵ Moreover, key Asian actors such as Japan and South Korea also condemn the *coup*. On the other hand, some other key international powers are a bit more ambivalent. Russia has refused to condemn the coup, only asking for a resumption of a political dialogue and a peaceful settlement, reason being that Russia is a key strategic partner and an ally to the military government (East Asia Forum, 2021). Another key player to examine is China. Somewhat surprisingly, China abstended from voting on the Resolution. The reasoning, though not entirely clear, likely lies in the fact that China is also a large strategic partner of Myanmar and it has, much like Russia, taken subtle steps suggesting it could accept the military government's legitimacy (The New York Times, 2021). We can see that, although a majority of countries condemn the actions of the military government, some countries with a veto in the Security Council (SC) don't exactly share the sentiment. This will undoubtedly shape the debate in our committee.

⁴ See the UN General Assembly Resolution A/75/L.85.

⁵ See EU Parliament, Answer to a Parliamentary Question, Question Reference: E-000637/2021.

General Assembly resolutions, though politically important and able to transition into international customary law (and as such being legally binding), are *per se* not legally binding. This is where the role of the Security Council should be considered – if acting under the VII Chapter of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council can issue legally binding documents. With there being calls for action of the Security Council by the Special Envoy for Myanmar – Christine Schraner Burgener – the role and powers of SC should be considered (United Nations, 2021).

As established just above, the main goal of the United Nations is to maintain peace and security, the authoritative means of doing just that is *via* the SC. With its 15 members – 5 permanent and 10 having a mandate – the SC can adopt documents either under the VI or under the VII chapter of the UN Charter. The former mode of operation offers the SC the option of investigating any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute and recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment if it determines that the situation may endanger international peace and security.⁶ Such recommendations are generally considered to not be binding. The latter mode of functioning differs in just that – when the SC operates under the VII Chapter of the UN Charter it can issue binding measures, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security.⁷ The committee should explore the different kinds of sanctions, especially ones used in the past and try to delve into their relevance for the de-escalation of the *coup*.

It is also worth mentioning that the International Criminal Court (ICC) recognizes the SC as one of the bodies that can refer cases to the Court according to the Rome Statute – as such, the referral is one of the sources for the ICC's jurisdiction⁸ and thus an option to consider, should the circumstances point to individual criminal responsibility.

⁶ See Chapter VI of the UN Charter, especially Article 35.

⁷ See Chapter VII of the UN Charter, especially Articles 41 and 42.

⁸ See Article 13 of the Rome Statute.

As far as legal proceedings go, we have two pending cases on the table which may be affected by the coup. On the one hand, we have a case before the international Court of Justice (ICJ), the so-called Genocide Convention case,⁹ concerning the past actions of Myanmar. The *coup* and the change of government might affect the case and the proceedings, though the future approach that Myanmar will take regarding the proceedings is unclear and thus we can only speculate on the implications of the current situation for the case. The other relevant case is in the jurisdiction of the aforementioned ICC – the situation concerning the Bangladesh and Myanmar areas. In 2019, the Prosecutor was authorized to start an investigation for the alleged crimes. The impact of the *coup*, however, is speculated to be smaller than that of the ICJ case, if not negligible (Pillai, 2021).

With the legal perspectives on the situation laid out, the role of the SC in this wider context should be considered. As Rosenthal notes in his independent inquiry into the involvement of the UN in Myanmar (2019), the main challenge of the UN's involvement is a dichotomy of sorts: on the one hand, it should strive to provide maximum humanitarian assistance and help the country develop, on the other, Myanmar's government should be held responsible for what are generally recognized as violations of international law norms, especially in the area of human rights. Though the report came out in 2019 and analyzed the UN's involvement up to that point, the same tension can be observed today. The role of the SC in finding the balance between those two aspects should be considered.

V. Issues to Address

Firstly, the risk that the *coup* represents for the peace and security for the international community should be considered. What exactly is the risk and what does it mean for the international community? Furthermore, how does it impact the SC's powers?

⁹ Gambia v. Myanmar, filed on 11 November 2019.

Secondly, the issue of violence and human rights violations should be addressed. With the deterioration of the political situation, the humanitarian needs are growing. How should the SC approach and address these issues?

Thirdly, the Council will have to consider the different countries' views on the situation. As mentioned above, veto members are not unanimous in their views of the »new« government, its legitimacy and how the situation should unfold. How should the Council act as to, on the one hand, provide the people of Myanmar with security and the respect for their human rights, and on the other, still be able to pass measures that will not be »veto-ed«? What kind of action is the most appropriate in this sense?

VI. Further Reading

Delegates should be familiar with the UN Charter, especially with chapters VI and VII. In addition, the following materials should be consulted:

- Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, 2021;
- A brief and independent inquiry into the involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018, Gert Rosenthal, 2019.

REVISING THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT

by Una Iza Grandovec

I. Introduction

The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed in 1995 by the parties involved in the Bosnian War, ended the conflict while simultaneously transforming the geopolitical landscape and the dynamic in the region in the post-war period. It achieved the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two parts, approximately equal in size: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The goal of the Agreement was to bring peace and stability to the wider region of Balkans, however, the tensions are rising and the dissatisfaction by the people is becoming more and more apparent as the time goes by. There are calls to revisit and revise the Dayton Agreement, while some parties root for a complete secession from the unified country.

II. The Bosnian War


The Dayton Peace Agreement marks the end of the conflict widely known as the Bosnian War. The events that make up the prelude to the war — and thus to the Agreement — are complex to understand and hard to summarize in a few pages due to the number of parties involved and their long-running historical relations, with issues rooted deeply in the previous centuries. For this reason, the starting point of this Study Guide will be the Bosnian War, a consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia.

The Bosnian War flared up in 1992 due to the secession of its federative unit Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The move was not supported by the large Serb population in the federative unit, who

boycotted the independence referendum in 1992, leading to its passing. The Serb population backed the government of the Serbian federative unit, led by Slobodan Milošević, while the tensions started to rise between the Bosniaks and Croats as well, leading to Croat-Bosniak War in 1993. (Wikipedia, 2021)

The Ethnic Dimension of the Conflict

To grasp the complexity of the situation and understand why there are many equally important parties involved, one must understand the ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The population census, conducted in 1991, i.e. just before the war, had shown that the multi-ethnic republic consisted from Muslim Bosniaks (appr. 43.5%), Orthodox Serbs (appr. 31.2%), and Catholic Croats (appr. 17.4%) (Tanović et al., 2014); for the distribution of ethnicities see Figure 1.



The reasons for the importance of ethnic constitution and distribution of the republic are two-fold — they represent both the cause and the outcome of the Dayton Agreement; the cause being the tensions between different ethnicities, wishing to live under different leaderships, leading to the outburst of war, whereas the outcome of the Agreement is shown in the partition and organisation of the current Bosnian government. The outcome is explained in the detail in the section III. (The Dayton Agreement), whereas the focus of this section are the ethnic tensions that caused the war.

After Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in 1991 and were subsequently recognized by the European Community, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit and

organized an independence referendum. As mentioned above, the referendum was either boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, or voting in the areas with the majority population being Serbian was obstructed by the Serb Democratic Party, led by Radovan Karadžić. This move resulted in a third of population not casting a vote, with the other two thirds of the electorate mostly voting in favour of the independence. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2020)

The ethnic constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was bound to cause separatist movements — in 1991, several self-proclaimed Serb Autonomous Regions were established, with the goal to secure autonomy in majority Serb-populated areas. In the same year, the Serb Democratic Party ceased to attend the meetings of Bosnian governmental structures in favor of newly-established Serb National Assembly in Banja Luka. The action was clear — the Serbs did not want to stay within the Bosnian governmental organization anymore. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2020)

The situation in Croatian part was a bit different — the Croatian Democratic Party (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) at first held a peaceful stance, emphasizing cooperation between ethnicities within a confederal Yugoslavia. The Croat population widely supported the Bosnian independence movement, however, part of the the population, especially those living in Western Herzegovina, saw it as a step toward the Croatian unification into ‘Greater Croatia’. The dynamic within the Bosnian HDZ branch started to change from Bosnian unity towards Croatian independence and an entity, similar to the Serb Autonomous Regions was declared — the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. The International Criminal Trial for the former Yugoslavia concluded that the establishment of the aforementioned entity was not done in order to secure its independence, but to unite with Croatia; e.g. Croatian currency was adopted. Unofficial talks were held with Serbian leadership to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with the official stance of partnership with the Bosnian leadership. With the latter, negotiations were carried out to decide who would take the control of the ethnically mixed city of Mostar, however they ultimately failed and war between the two ethnicities broke out as well. (The Princeton Encyclopedia, 2021)

Another sequence of events that is directly connected to not only the ethnic tensions in the region, but to the acts of the United Nations as well — the genocide that accompanied the events of war. Especially horrifying was the extermination of Bosniaks in Srebrenica, carried out by Bosnian Serbs — the massacre fitting the defined nature of genocide as per Shaw (2017),¹⁰ in ordinance with the conclusion reached by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). Srebrenica was impactful as well due to the involvement of the United Nations, as the organization failed to prevent the massacre.

With the UNSC Resolution 743, the United Nations Security Council established a peace-keeping mission in 1992 named UNPROFOR, originally to establish secure conditions in Croatia (S/RES/743, 1992). However, as the conflict was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UNPROFOR mandate was expanded to include said area (Peacekeeping UN, 1996). The peace-keeping force was subsequently present also in the town of Srebrenica, but was often attacked along with the civilians by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, leading to the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 819, which was first of its kind, as it was a first resolution to establish civilian ‘safe areas’ (S/RES/819, 1993). However, the massacre was carried out nonetheless — roughly 8’000 Bosniaks were killed in 1995 by the Bosnian Serb forces, operated by Ratko Mladić (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017). The genocide was persecuted by both national and international courts — namely, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, established by the UN Security Council in 1993, and by the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, the Netherlands was ruled to be accountable for the actions of its own peacekeeping forces, that were operating under the UN mandate by the Dutch appeals court (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017).

¹⁰ Shaw (2017) describes Srebrenica as an example of “[...] intent to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular group and this may apply to a geographically limited area [...]”, which is necessary for the act to constitute genocide in the international law.

The genocide left a mark on the region — as the tension within the country rises and calls for division of the state reappear, there are fears by survivors of such a massacre being carried out again (Al Jazeera, 2021). The ethnic dimension visibly carries important emphasis on the start, the progression and not only also the end of the conflict, but the post-war dynamic as well. For this reason, issues that stem directly from the ethnic constitution of the region are explained and highlighted in this Study Guide, whereas the detailed explanation of war events is not given — delegates are encouraged to read on them themselves.

III. The Dayton Agreement

The peace talks to stabilize the region and end the conflict began in 1995. The location, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, was chosen to minimize the effect of media on the progression of the talks. The participants of the talks were the presidents of their respective republics — Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and Franjo Tuđman of Croatia, along with the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation and the European Union. The presidency consisted of Richard Holbrooke, a representative of the United States, and of the cochairs Carl Bildt, the EU Special Representative, and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020)

The outcome of the talks was, of course, the Dayton Peace Agreement, titled originally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The document spans 11 Articles and 12 Annexes (with Annex 1 being divided into 1-A and 1-B), with the recognition of the tragic nature of the conflict and utmost importance of the goal of peace and stability in the region being expressed in the preambulatory clauses. The 11 Articles reiterate the commitment of the parties to abide by the principles, set by the United Nations Charter and other important documents and principles of the International Law, and to uphold the agreements made in the Annexes. Article X emphasises the mutual recognition

of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as sovereign states. (The Dayton Agreement, 1995)

While the Annexes 1-A and 1-B promote the regional stabilizations through military proceedings, Annexes 2 through 4 arrange the statehood aspect of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as borders, elections and the constitution. Annex 2 is especially significant, as it represents the agreement of the Parties about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, drawing up the so-called Inter-Entity Boundary Line. The Article V of Annex 2 also binds




Figure 2

the Parties to enter arbitration regarding the disputed Brčko District.¹¹ The governmental organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is further detailed in Annex 4, which contains country's constitution, establishing for example a collegial presidency. (The Dayton Agreement, 1995)

The unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its simultaneous division into two entities is a topic of relevance even today — the prevalence of secessionist movements and calls for division are popular topics especially regarding Republika Srpska. There is no secret that member of the presidency that represents the Serbian population, Milorad Dodik, is in favour of the entity's independence referendum, as well as extremely against the current organization of Bosnia's Constitutional Court, which contains foreign judges as per the

¹¹ Awarded to The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999 by the Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brčko Area (Office of the High Representative, 1999).

Dayton Agreement. The agreed upon points from the 1995 document are thus visibly an origin of disagreement and tension within the population of the former warzone. (Al Jazeera, 2020)

IV. The UN Security Council activity regarding the post-war situation and EUFOR

The United Nations Security Council holds a meeting on the issue semi-annually, usually receiving a briefing from the High Representative and EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, or for the extension of EUFOR mandate. EUFOR, also known as the Operation ALTHEA, is the military deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which oversees the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, succeeding NATO's IFOR (EUFOR BiH, 2021). The Executive Mandate to continue operating is given by the UN Security Council (EUFOR BiH, 2021), as said council established it with the UN SC Resolution 1575 in 2004 (S/RES/1575, 2004).

V. High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina

The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina is an ad hoc office established with the Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement with the role of ensuring and overseeing the implementation of said document (Office of the High Representative, 2021). As of August 1st of 2021, Christian Schmidt has assumed office, replacing Valentin Inzko, who had been on the position since 2009 (European Western Balkans, 2021a).

The position has become controversial, especially regarding its jurisdiction and role within the political and legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Firstly, the competencies granted by the Annex to the High Representative are broadly defined, with the document rewarding the position the final authority on its interpretation (The Dayton Agreement, 1995), leading many to question whether this made the position to be *legibus solutus* (Banning, 2014). Furthermore, the Peace Implementation Council (further referred to as PIC), a body that oversees the implementation of the Agreement as well, has granted the High

Representative so-called *Bonn Powers*, broadening the position's jurisdiction even more (Banning, 2014).

For example, as granted by the Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement, the High Representative can pass legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to many controversial decisions, mostly from passing bills that have previously failed within the ordinary legislative procedure. Furthermore, the office of the High Representative is responsible for establishing the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as initiating the judicial reform, leaving many, especially the Council of Europe, questioning lawfulness of such an action and making CoE declare it as a potential violation of the Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights. (Banning, 2014)

The latest controversy with the OHR's ability to pass legislation is recent – the former High Representative Valentin Inzko has, just before stepping down from the position, passed a law, which prohibits the genocide denial by making it a felony, listed in the Criminal Code of BiH and punished with up to five years in prison. The action sparked outrage, especially by Republika Srpska. (RTVSLO, 2021)

Another problem is caused by the OHR's power to dismiss both elected and non-elected public officials, deemed detrimental to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, while also banning them for holding public office for lifetime. The issue lies within the possibility of abuse of such an instrument, since the removed officials do not have the option to request a hearing, neither is any system of appellations in place. Another issue is the volume – some High Representatives e.g. Wolfgang Petritsch and Paddy Ashdown have executed mass removals, with the latter removing as much as 58 officials from their positions. (Banning, 2014)

Furthermore, one of the issues had arose recently – the Annex 10 requires the OHR to be appointed with the United Nations Security Council (The Dayton Agreement, 1995), which was not adhered to in the latest appointment of Christian Schmidt, who was chosen by the

PIC, whereas the UN Security Council was merely notified of the change (European Western Balkans, 2021b). Republika Srpska along with the Russian Federation have expressed their dismissal of the appointment, considering the position to be vacant until a decision passes the United Nations Security Council (European Western Balkans, 2021b).

There have been talks to abolish the position altogether – the Russian Federation and China have drafted a resolution which terminates the Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, however the resolution failed to pass in the Security Council with only aforementioned two countries in favor, with others abstaining (The United Nations, 2021). The representative of the UK stated that such an action would mean a premature end of the office, since the conditions have not been met in order to abolish it (The United Nations, 2021). The conditions have been outlined by the former OHR Miroslav Lajčak – the resolution of state property and defence property, completion of the Brčko Final Award, fiscal sustainability and entrenchment of the rule of law must be achieved cumulatively in order for the office to be viable for closure (OHR, 2008).

VI. Issues to Address

Your main focus will be to address the political situation in current Bosnia and Herzegovina. How can the United Nations Security Council help to reduce the risk of the ‘Conflict, Frozen in Time’ from breaking out again?

Another point of focus can be the role on the UN Security Council in the prevention of ethnic cleansing – what kind of measures need to be taken in order to prevent the situation, similar to that of Srebrenica, to occur again? Where has the UNSC failed and how can that be avoided in the future? Are there any effective mechanisms the UNSC can implement in order to recognise and prevent such events?

Evaluate the role of EUFOR in peace-keeping. Are the current goals being met? Does it serve its purpose?

Evaluate the role and the future of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially regarding the position's competencies and appointment. Does the office need to be reorganized or completely revoked? And should the Security Council appoint a High Representative, or should they just leave the situation as it is?

VII. Links for Further Reading

[The Dayton Agreement, 1995](#)

[Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution 53/35 \(The Fall of Srebrenica\)](#)

[The UN Security Council 8823rd meeting \(Regarding the OHR\)](#)

[China and Russian Federation: draft resolution \(S/2021/667\)](#)

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